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The Effects of the Security Environment on Military Expenditures: 
Pooled Analyses of 165 Countries, 1950-20001 
 
William Nordhaus, John R. Oneal, and Bruce Russett 
 





Countries’ military expenditures differ greatly across both space and time. This study 
examines the determinants of military spending, with particular reference to the 
importance of the external security environment. Using the liberal-realist model of 
international relations, we first estimate the probability that two countries will be 
involved in a fatal militarized interstate dispute. We then aggregate these ex ante 
estimates of the likelihood of dyadic conflict, calculating the annual joint probability 
that a country will be involved in a fatal dispute. This is our measure of the external 
threat. We then estimate the level of military spending by country and year as a 
function of the security environment, arms races with foes and the defense expenditures 
of friendly countries, states’ involvement in actual military conflict, economic output, 
and various other political variables. In analyses of a panel of 165 countries, 1950 to 
2000, we find that the security environment is a powerful determinant of military 
spending. Indeed, our prospectively measured estimate of the external threat is more 
influential than any of several influences known only ex post. Our best estimate is that a 
one percentage point rise in the probability of a fatal dispute leads to a 3 percent 
increase in military spending.
                                                 
1 We thank participants in workshops at the Department of Political Science, Stanford 
University; the Conflict and Cooperation Conference, Northwestern University; and 
the 2009 NBER Summer Institute on Economics of National Security for helpful 
comments.  All data and computations will be provided on a website. We are grateful 
for the research assistance of Dr. Xi Chen of Yale University. 
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 Research on the causes of war has advanced rapidly over the past fifteen years 
through the analysis of pairs of states observed through time. Pooled dyadic time series 
allow researchers to address a question of central interest to scholars, policy makers, 
and citizens alike: who is likely to fight whom? Here we use information about who 
may fight to address another important question: why are some states heavily armed? 
Countries vary enormously in the resources they devote to the military, with Costa Rica 
at one end and large powers facing many perceived external threats at the other; but 
great differences are evident even among states that appear similar in resources and 
geopolitical position.  
 
We undertake two tasks, using an almost complete sample of countries over the 
second half of the twentieth century. First, we measure the threat in countries’ security 
environments using the predictions of the dyadic liberal-realist model (LRM) of 
interstate conflict aggregated to the state level. This model incorporates elements from 
two major schools of international relations: the liberal, in which states’ political 
regimes and their economic relations influence the likelihood they will become involved 
in a militarized dispute, and the realist, with its emphasis on the absolute and relative 
power of nations, their alliances, and geographic considerations.  
 
Second, we use these annual estimates of countries’ external threats to explain 
their military expenditures. Economic models of military spending typically treat a 
state’s expenditures as an optimization problem, with a demand function to maximize 
external security from a threat (typically measured by rivals’ military spending), subject 
to a budget constraint and other factors, expenditures of allies, and the spillover of 
private goods such as internal security. These influences vary greatly both across 
countries and over time; but military spending also may exhibit a high degree of inertia 
from external processes (arms races or the experience of violent conflict) or from 
internal influences, such as organizational inertia or a “military-industrial complex.” 
The major innovation in our study is to develop and use new measures of the external 
threat in explaining defense expenditures; these are measured ex post by the actual 
frequency of disputes and the fatality rate of actual conflicts but also ex ante as the 
predicted probability of a militarized dispute using the LRM. This is the first time that a 
study has used a broad prospectively measured gauge of the external security 
environment as an explanatory variable of defense expenditures. 
 
 That the security environment should influence national military spending is 
hardly surprising, but the ex ante probability of a militarized interstate dispute (MID) is 
an unexpectedly powerful determinant. A one percentage point increase in the 
aggregate probability of a MID, as predicted by the LRM, leads to a three percent 
increase in a country’s military expenditures. Indeed, the ex ante probability of conflict 
proves to be a greater, more robust determinant of military spending than are our ex 
post measures of actual conflict. A country’s size, measured by its gross domestic 
product (GDP), is also a powerful determinant of its military spending. Additionally, 
we find significant inertia in national expenditures, with spending responding with 
sizable lags to changes in output or the level of threat.  
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In addition to explaining important determinants of defense spending, our 
research provides a valuable “external” test (Lakotos 1978) of the widely accepted 
liberal-realist model of interstate conflict by demonstrating its ability to generate 
important predictions about additional phenomena: national military expenditures.  
 
The Liberal-Realist Model (LRM) of Dyadic Interstate Conflict 
 
 We begin with a brief discussion of the determinants of interstate conflict that are 
incorporated into the liberal-realist model. We then consider some of the statistical 
issues that arise in estimating this regression equation. In subsequent sections, we 
discuss factors that affect national military expenditures and then estimate several 
models to clarify the importance of these various influences, focusing on the security 
environment as measured by the LRM.  
 
 Research on the causes of war has increasingly relied upon pooled dyadic time 
series. Under this approach, the unit of analysis is the state of relations between two 
countries in a given year (a “dyad-year”). The occurrence of a violent dispute between 
the two countries is taken to be a function of political, economic, and military 
characteristics of the two countries individually along with certain dyadic features such 
as trade, alliances, and geography. Such an analysis would provide, for example, 
estimates of the probability of a conflict between the United States and Iraq in a 
particular year as a function of a set of national and dyadic characteristics. Analyses of 
pooled dyad-year data can include not only political characteristics of the states but also 
elements of national culture or even attributes of individual leaders. They can easily 
accommodate inherently relational variables—for example, the balance of power—that 
are difficult to incorporate in the time series of individual states. At the other end of the 
spectrum, dyadic analyses can also include features of the international system, such as 
the distribution of national capabilities among the major powers or the concentration of 
power in the hands of the largest state. 
 
 Our dyadic model of interstate conflict includes elements from both the liberal 
(or Kantian) and the realist schools and is the outgrowth of early work by Solomon 
Polachek (1980) and Stuart Bremer (1992). To represent liberal theory, we include 
measures of the political character of the two states, assessed along the autocracy-
democracy continuum, and the degree to which the states are economically 
interdependent, as represented by the economic importance of bilateral trade. In accord 
with realist thought, we add a measure of the dyadic balance of power; a measure of 
states’ ability to project their military capabilities; an indicator of a defense pact, non-
aggression treaty, entente, or other security agreement; and variables that capture 
states’ geographic proximity. We also consider each dyad’s historical experience of 
violence, measured by the years of peace since its last fatal militarized interstate dispute 
(MID); however, this variable introduces serious statistical problems, as we show.  
 
 
We write the standard LRM model as follows: 
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(1)  , , ,( )  [ ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ),...] ( )ε= +
fatal
i j i j i jp t f Polity t Economic t Geography t PeaceYears t t   
 
Here , ( )
fatal
i jp t  is the dyad-year probability of a fatal militarized dispute, one involving 
at least one combatant’s death, between states i and j in year t. This variable equals one 
when a dispute was ongoing and zero when there was no dispute. The explanatory 
variables in equation (1) have been developed in the literature on predicting the onset of 
interstate conflict. We capture the effect of states’ political regimes using the lower and 
higher democracy scores in a dyad (Oneal and Russett 1997). Economic 
interdependence is represented by the lower bilateral trade-to-GDP ratio, which 
represents the degree to which the less constrained state is free to use force. The 
influence of the power of the states is expressed in the balance of national capabilities of 
military significance, measured by the relative size of the two countries ( GDPlarge 
/ GDPsmall + GDPlarge ); this represents the naïve probability of the larger state winning a 
military contest. 2 We account for the ability of the more powerful state to project its 
military capabilities using the logarithm of its GDP in year t; this variable is normalized 
by world gross product to remove the long-term trend.  
 
 To represent the influence of geography, we include an indicator of contiguity 
and the logarithm of the capital-to-capital distance separating the two states. System Size 
is a correction for variation over time in the number of states in the international 
system. , ( )i jPeaceYears t is a term reflecting the history of conflict between countries i 
and j designed to correct for temporal dependence in the dyadic time series. In earlier 
studies, the peace-years variable was introduced along with three splines to capture the 
effect of lagged values of that variable, but we omit the splines to simplify the 
presentation. , ( )i j tε is a random error term. Russett and Oneal (2001), Oneal and Russett 
(2005) and Hegre, Oneal, and Russett (2010) provide details regarding the definitions of 
these variables and the sources of our data. 
 
 Estimates of the onset of militarized interstate disputes  
 
In the first two columns of Table 1, we report estimates of the standard liberal-
realist model of the onset of a fatal militarized interstate dispute, first for the years 1885-
2000 and then for the post-World War II period, 1950 – 2000. The pooled time series of 
over 12,000 pairs of states are analyzed using logistic regression analysis with a panel 
estimator in STATA 10.1. There are 435,632 and 405,528 observations (dyad-years), 
respectively. 3 Fixed country or time effects are not included, and the robust standard 
errors are adjusted for clustering by dyad. We consider only onsets, the first year of a 
                                                 
2 Trade and GDP data are Gleditsch’s (2002) current version found at 
http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/exptradegdp.html 
3 Our analysis omits all states with population below 500,000 as well as Kiribati, 
Tuvalu, and Tonga. These countries are relatively insignificant in the military context 
and have missing data in the Correlates of War database. 
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dispute, and exclude subsequent years of an on-going dispute as recommended by 
Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998). 
 
The results of our analyses of the two sets of cases are similar: (1) Two 
democracies are very peaceful, two autocracies less so, and mixed pairs fight a lot. (2) 
Economic interdependence reduces conflict. (3) A preponderance of power increases the 
prospects for peace, while a balance of capabilities is dangerous. (4) Large powers are 
prone to fight, presumably because their interests are widespread and their capabilities 
for defending and promoting them are substantial. (5) An alliance reduces the 
likelihood of military conflict, though, surprisingly, good economic relations provide a 
greater assurance of peace than does an explicit security agreement. (6) Conflict is much 
more likely for states that are geographically proximate. As a result of variability in 
these influences, the predicted values derived from the LRM vary substantially across 
dyads.  
 
 There are, of course, many unanswered questions in research using the liberal-
realist model. All the variables included in the LRM tend to vary slowly over time, so 
these analyses do much better in identifying the “dangerous dyads” than when those 
states will actually fight (Glick and Taylor forthcoming). The model captures the 
permissive rather than the proximate causes of interstate conflict (Waltz 1954). Research 
on civil wars suffers from the same deficiency (Sambanis 2004). In this respect, social 
scientists investigating the causes of war are like geophysicists predicting earthquakes. 
Scientists can identify earthquake-prone regions with confidence; they are much less 
successful in predicting the timing of particular events. Similarly, the likelihood of 
conflict for some states is far lower than for others, but we cannot predict when it will 
break out, even for the violence-prone pairs. 
 
 Estimates including all years of conflict 
 
The standard approach to estimating the LRM is to use only the onset of a 
dispute and omit observations that are continuations of the same conflict. For example, 
the United States and North Vietnam fought from 1963 through 1972. Using the 
standard approach, the first year (1963) of conflict would be included but all remaining 
years of that conflict would be dropped. While this measure is appropriate for 
examining the transition from peace to conflict, it is inappropriate here because it does 
not capture the severity of the external military threat. If states anticipate the possibility 
of becoming involved in a protracted war, they would be expected to spend more on 
the military than if only brief skirmishes were anticipated. We therefore use a 
“continuation sample,” in which all years of all disputes are included, when assessing 
countries’ external threats and creating our measure of their security environments. 
 
Including all years of disputes leads, however, to biased estimates of the 
regression coefficients if we include “peace-years” in equation (1). The difficulty is 
easily shown. Suppose there is actually no relationship between the years a pair of 
states has been at peace and the occurrence of a militarized dispute. Then, regressing 
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onsets on the years of peace would yield a coefficient of zero. If we analyze the 
continuation sample, on the other hand, roughly half the years coded one represent the 
second, third, or later years of a dispute. After the first year of each MID, the peace-
years variable is set to zero. For the continuation years, therefore, there will be an 
inverse relationship between the years of peace and the probability of conflict. This 
inverse relationship is completely uninformative. It is simply an artifact of the 
construction of the peace-years variable.  
 
An example using the United States and North Korea over the period 1950-2000 
will illustrate the problem. Of the 51 years, there are 35 years in the non-continuation 
sample, with 11 years of conflict and 24 years of peace. If we use only the 35 years in the 
non-continuation sample, a simple logistic regression of the probability of a MID has a 
coefficient on peace-years of -0.149 (+ 0.12). However, in this dyadic time series there 
are 22 years of continued disputes. If we include all 51 years in the analysis, the 
estimated coefficient falls to -0.340 (+ 0.13). The lower coefficient in the continuation 
sample represents a downward bias arising from the fact that continuations of disputes 
are always associated with a zero value of peace-years. 
 
Thus, when we use the continuation sample (i.e., all years for each dyad), to 
obtain unbiased estimates we need either to omit the peace-years variable or to create 
an instrumental variable (IV) for it. If we solve equation (1) using past values of the 
, ( )
fatal
i jp t variable, we obtain as appropriate instruments the lagged liberal and realist 
variables (i.e., lags of the states’ polity scores, the dyadic balance of power, contiguity, 
etc.). We call the IV estimate of peace-years “PY-hat.” 
 
We also must take into consideration the possibility that conflict will have 
reciprocal influences on the other independent variables in equation (1). The onset of a 
serious dispute, for example, is expected to affect bilateral trade adversely; and the 
structure of government may change over the course of a major war. 4 We address this 
potential problem by constructing a set of “historical instrumental variables,” for each 
of the independent variables. These are equal to their actual values during peacetime 
and to their last peacetime values in a period of conflict. These historical IVs will be 
shown to be unnecessary so need not be discussed in detail. 
 
In Table 2, we report five sets of estimated coefficients for equation (1) with the 
continuation sample for the years 1950-2000. Column E, for reference purposes, gives 
the results of using the actual years of peace in the specification from Table 1. Thus, the 
results in column E correspond to the first column of Table 1. The only difference is that 
the continuation sample is employed in Table 2 and data regarding only the onset of 
conflicts (the non-continuation sample) are used in Table 1. Columns A through D show 
                                                 
4 Dyadic conflict reduces trade and inhibits transitions to democracy, but the reciprocal 




four different specifications for analyzing the continuation sample with IV variables 
included or excluded. Columns A and B report coefficients for the same equation 
shown in Table 1 with and without PY-hat and with other independent variables set at 
their actual values. In columns C and D, historical IVs are substituted for the 
explanatory variables of the LRM. 
 
Begin by comparing column E in Table 2 with the IV versions in columns A and 
C and the estimated coefficient for PY in the first column of Table 1. The coefficient in E 
is much more negative than the other estimates, indicating that the bias discussed 
earlier is indeed present when analyzing the continuation sample. (The bias is even 
greater if we use the spline function as is common, instead of the simple count of the 
years of peace.) Note also that the peace-years IV is statistically insignificant in column 
A and marginally significant in C. This suggests that peace-years is significant in 
column E because it is correlated with additional years of conflict , not because it 
contains information about prior values of the other independent variables. 
Figure 1 shows the stability of the estimated coefficients. It confirms that major 
differences appear between E and the other estimators for several of the independent 
variables. There are no systematic differences in the estimated coefficients across 
equations A through D. Some differences are due to different samples. Using IVs 
reduces the sample size. 
 
In our analyses of national military expenditures, we focus primarily on the 
specification in column B of Table 2. It is our preferred version for the following 
reasons. First, it is clearly desirable either to omit peace years or to use PY-hat, so that 
removes equation E from contention. Second, the IV for peace years is statistically 
insignificant at the .05 level in columns A and C, suggesting that those specifications are 
not superior. Third, there are no significant differences between the results in column D 
where the historical IVs are used and the analysis with the actual variables in B, but the 
latter are more precisely estimated. Apparently, the reciprocal effects of conflict on the 
theoretical variables of interest are a less important source of bias than is the peace-
years correction. Finally, equation B has the maximum sample size. This means that 
fewer imputations need to be made in constructing our estimates of the security 
environment for inclusion in our analyses of national military expenditures. 
 
Estimating the Annual Probability of a Fatal Dispute for Each Country 
 
 We now break new ground by using the liberal-realist model to calculate 
prospectively a summary measure of the threat each country faces in its external 
security environment. If the LRM captures the probability of serious interstate conflict, 
we should be able to use its predictions to help explain differences in military spending.  
 
The basic approach is to convert the dyad-year estimates of the probability of a 
fatal dispute from equation (1) into state-year probabilities suitable for inclusion in a 
model of military expenditures. We do this by calculating the annual probability that a 
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state will be involved in a fatal dispute with at least one other country, using the 
standard calculation for a joint probability from the individual components: 
 
(2)  ( ) ( ) ( ){ }ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ⋅⋅⋅fatal fatal fatal fatali i , 1 i , 2 i , np (t) = 1- 1- p (t) × 1- p (t) × × 1- p (t)  
 
In equation (2), ˆ fatalip (t)  is the state-year probability of at least one fatal MID for state i in 
year t, and ˆ fatali , jp (t)  is the estimated dyad-year probability of a dispute between states i 
and j from the LRM in equation (1). We call ˆ fatalip (t)  our “p-hat” estimates, indicating that 
it is the predicted probability of a dispute.  
 
We show our ex ante estimates of the annual probability of a fatal dispute for 
eight representative countries in Figure 2. “Phat B” is our preferred specification B from 
Table 2. “Phat E” is the specification in column E with actual peace years and the 
continuation sample. “Phat F” is derived from the first column of Table 1, where peace 
years were used with the non-continuation sample. An on-line appendix will provide a 
detailed list of countries and their average p-hat estimates. 
 
The graphs show the severity of the external threat of conflict faced by each 
country from 1950 through 2000. Differences in our Phat B variable, cross-nationally and 
through time, are purely the result of the predictors derived from liberal and realist 
theories; they do not include any country- or year-fixed effects. As can be seen by 
examining the left-hand scale, there are major differences between high-conflict 
countries like the United States, the USSR/Russia, China, and Israel and low-conflict 
countries such as Canada, South Africa or New Zealand. For all countries except China, 
the end of the Cold War brought a significant decline in the probability of a dispute. 
This is surely the most important “peace dividend” derived from the unexpected end of 
that dangerous period. 
 
The problem with using the actual years of peace in estimating p-hat with the 
continuation sample is again evident in Figure 2. The resulting time series (Phat E) 
move more erratically and are strongly influenced by the actual timing of disputes, not 
just their theoretical determinants. Leaving those estimates aside (as clearly biased), the 
other measures are highly correlated. The average correlation coefficient among the p-
hat variants A, B, C, and D is 0.965 for all countries and 0.958 for the largest 40 countries. 
 
Explaining National Military Expenditures 
 
We now turn to the principal focus of this paper: estimating the impact of the 
security environment on national military expenditures. A vast literature – both 
statistical and historical – considers the determinants of military spending. To our 
knowledge, however, no empirical study in international relations incorporates a 
comprehensive, ex ante measure of the external security environment of the kind we 
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use here. Studies that include a measure of external threat usually proxy that variable 
with ex post data on the military spending of foes. 
 
To clarify the significance of the empirical analyses presented in the next section, it 
is useful to distinguish normative from positive theories of military expenditures.  In 
the normative approach, military spending provides a national public good (with 
transnational spillovers). Nations provide their citizens with security from external 
threats by allocating resources to the armed forces. Expenditures are, of course, limited 
by the size of the national economy. A nation’s security environment is determined 
primarily by “objective” threats of military conflict and the cost of any ongoing 
militarized disputes. We are particularly interested in the influence of the security 
environment as represented by the LRM.  
 
The positive approach emphasizes various other elements in explaining military 
spending: the political power of the “military-industrial complex,” bureaucratic inertia, 
self-perpetuating arms races, and domestic politics (Russett 1970). We combine the two 
approaches to some degree, so our results shed light on their relative importance.  
Primarily, however, we are interested in how objective circumstances influence national 
defense expenditures. That interpretation fits with the characterization, common among 
economists, of military expenditures as an optimization problem.5  
 
Table 3 shows the most and least conflict-prone countries in our sample, along 
with the average of their annual military expenditure-to-GDP ratios, 1950-2000. 6 The 
difference in the security environments between the two groups is striking, and it is 
clear that the external threat does influence national military expenditures. The four 
least threatened countries spend on average only 1.8% of GDP on their armed forces; 
the four that are most endangered spend four times as much, 5.7%. There is, however, 
considerable variability within the top group, indicating that other factors importantly 
influence military spending. 
 
Empirical Estimates of the Determinants of Military Expenditures: Specification 
 
Our analyses cover the period 1950 to 2000. This is appropriate because the 
international system was relatively stable, although there were certainly significant 
changes, particularly the end of the Cold War. We exclude the immediate aftermath of 
World War II because of the turmoil involved in the demobilization of the victors and 
the vanquished alike and the shortage of data for these years. We stop in 2000 because 
some data are unavailable beyond that. We report results for two samples: 165 
countries, for which we have 6607 observations; and the 40 countries with the largest 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Sandler and Hartley (1995, Chapter 2) and Smith (1995). 
 
6 Data are for states that gained independence during the period begin after 1950. Very 
small countries such as Singapore and Fiji have been excluded. 
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GDPs in 1980, with 1906 observations. (Note that some of the countries are successor 
states to countries that have fissioned, e.g., Ukraine from the USSR.) 
 
Though we focus on the impact of the threat environment on military spending, 
we also consider several other potentially important influences. The most important is, 
of course, the size of a nation’s economy, as measured by GDP. Additional variables fall 
into four categories.  
 
Arms races and alliances. The first set of ex post geopolitical variables captures the 
effects of arms races with adversaries and the expenditures of allies. The 
contemporaneous expenditures of potentially hostile powers may be taken by national 
leaders as evidence of a heightened threat that necessitates a greater commitment of 
resources to the military. The expenditures by adversaries has been the most common 
way of measuring external threats in previous research and has long been modeled as 
an action-reaction cycle.7 Alliances and informal international agreements may carry a 
commitment for support in particular circumstances, which can also influence a 
nation’s expenditures on the military.8  
 
Consequently, we constructed two measures of the military expenditures of 
other states. One is the sum of the military spending of “friends” in a year. The other is 
the military spending of potential “foes” in a year. We identified a state’s friends and its 
foes using Signorino and Ritter’s (1999) statistical measure (S) of the similarity of two 
states’ alliance portfolios. Following Bueno de Mesquita (1981), we assume in 
constructing these indices that countries with the same allies (and non-allies) have 
similar or complementary foreign policies and security interests.  
 
 For each country, we ranked all other states in each year according to the 
similarity of their alliance portfolios using Signorino’s S. States above the median were 
assumed to be friends; all states with S below the median were considered potential 
foes. We then summed the military expenditures of friends to obtain our measure of the 
spending of allies and other friendly nations. The variable for the military expenditures 
of foes was constructed similarly. These two measures are designed to capture the 
                                                 
7 See Rapoport (1957) on early arms race analyses traceable to Lewis Frye Richardson, 
primarily about how arms races may cause wars; see Sandler and Hartley (1995, 
Chapter 4) and Brito and Intriligator (1995) for more recent work. Dunne and Smith 
(2007) provide a good discussion of panel and cross-sectional models. 
8 The canonical reference on collective action is Olson and Zeckhauser (1966). In an 
alliance, large states are expected to spend disproportionately on the public good and 
smaller ones “free-ride”. The predicted net effect for the alliance as a whole is 
suboptimal spending. More recently, see Murdoch (1995); Sandler and Hartley (1995), 
Chapter 2; Murdoch and Sandler (1995); Oneal and Diehl (1994); Oneal and Whatley 
(1996); and the articles reproduced as chs. 22-26 in Hartley and Sandler, eds. (2001). 
The “friends” variable does not completely capture issues raised by the presence of 
alliances, but a detailed treatment is beyond our scope here. 
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influence of other states’ contemporaneous military expenditures. In the regression 
analysis, we take the logarithm of the spending of friends and foes to put them on the 
same scale as our dependent variable. 
 
In addition to capturing the influence of alliance commitments for coordinated 
expenditures with friends and the consequences of arms races with potential foes, these 
two measures provide a valuable control for the transmission of military conflict 
through these channels. A state may be required or consider it prudent to spend more 
money on its armed forces when either a friendly country or a hostile power is involved 
in a military conflict, even if it is not immediately drawn into the fighting. 
 
 Actual conflict. We address the influence of actual, ongoing conflict on military 
expenditures using two variables. The first of these additional ex post measures is the 
incidence rate of fatal disputes. We started by calculating the fraction of a state’s dyadic 
relations in each year that were marked by a fatal MID, this being the total number of 








∑ , divided by n, the number of states j in 





( ) 1 1 =
⎛ ⎛ ⎞ ⎞
⎜ ⎜ ⎟ ⎟
− = − −⎜ ⎜ ⎟ ⎟
⎜ ⎜ ⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟ ⎟












Our ex post variable p-actual is constructed so that it has the same units as our 
prospectively measured p-hat in equation (2) ; therefore, the two coefficients estimated 
in the analyses below are directly comparable.9 Naturally, we expect that states that 
experience a higher incidence of fatal militarized disputes will spend more on their 
armed forces. 
 
 In addition to the number of disputes in which a country is involved, national 
military expenditures should reflect the intensity of those conflicts. Therefore, our 
second gauge of actual conflict is the number of deaths a country’s combatants suffered 
in conflicts with all other states in a year, normalized by the population of the country.10 
                                                 
9 A few analysts (notably Goldsmith 2003) have used the incidence of wars, but not the 
much more frequent MIDs. We use fatal MIDs to tap the effect on expenditures of a 
wide range of interstate conflicts. We also ran tests with the predicted probability of a 
war and substituted a binary indicator of whether state i experienced a fatal dispute 
with any state in year t. The results were consistent with those we report in the tables. 
10 Fordham and Walker (2005) use total battle deaths in wars, but their data are not 
annual estimates and do not include MIDs below the threshold of 1000 combatant 




We expect that states will spend more in years when they experience a relatively large 
number of fatalities. In short, military expenditures are thought to be a function of the 
number and intensity of interstate disputes a country experiences in the course of a 
year. 
 
 It is important to emphasize that p-hat (the state-year estimates of threat we 
derive from the LRM) is a prospective measure of the dangers in a country’s security 
environment. It should capture the anticipated economic requirements for fielding a 
military that is adequate to support a state’s objectives and policies. States may favor 
the status quo, or be revisionist in their relations with other countries, or combine these 
objectives. When states are conservative and seek to maintain the status quo, p-hat is a 
better measure of the anticipated cost of deterring aggression than is the cost of actually 
defending territory. States may seek to modify the status quo and use their military 
capabilities to promote their interests, either by means of coercive diplomacy or by 
actual force of arms (George 1991; Jackson and Morelli 2008). States should prefer 
coercive diplomacy, just as they prefer deterrence, because the cost—in human life 
certainly—is generally lower. In explaining national military expenditures, then, we 
need to consider both the risk of conflict that nations anticipate and the costs they 
actually incur when deterrence fails or coercive diplomacy proves inadequate. 
 
 In sum, we expect national military expenditures to be a function of policy 
makers’ ex ante estimates of the armed forces necessary for their nations’ foreign 
policies, given the environment in which they expect to operate. They will normally 
seek to deter adversaries from resorting to military force and prefer to promote their 
interests by coercive diplomacy; but states are not always successful in achieving their 
objectives merely by the threat or show of force. As Engels observed, battle is to power 
what cash is to credit. Sometimes deterrence fails, and the military must defend the 
country or its strategic interests; or states may chose to force compliance with their 
demands if threats and demonstrations are insufficient. Thus, national military 
expenditures should reflect both ex ante and ex post influences.   
 
 Democracy. A tradition of liberal thought back to Kant suggests that popular 
opinion will resist the diversion of resources to military preparations and away from 
private consumption or other collective goods like public health and education. Citizens 
in democratic countries may also fear that a strong military establishment may suppress 
civil liberties. A contemporary version of the theory argues that, in states governed by 
small coalitions, autocrats will be able to extract private goods from rents associated 
with the successful threat or use of military force internationally and impose much of 
the cost on the general population. Hence autocracies should spend proportionately 
more on the military (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2004; Fordham and Walker 2005; 
Goldsmith 2003). 11  
                                                 
11 Democracies may be able to spend more in wartime (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2004). 
For a different rationale for the lower expenditures of democratic countries, see 




Bureaucratic or organizational inertia. Finally, military spending often has great 
inertia and may react slowly to geopolitics, especially to the disappearance of great 
threats. For example, after the end of the Cold War, military spending in most countries 
declined relatively slowly. There may be many reasons for this, including the putative 
lobbying power of vested interests (what Eisenhower called the “military-industrial 
complex,” for example), uncertainty regarding the permanence of change, and the 
difficulties of dismantling a system with a large overhead.  
 
In the following estimates, we anticipate a partial adjustment of military 
spending to the desired level. Assume that the steady-state level of desired military 
spending is M*(t). We expect actual spending to adjust to the desired level by the 
process ΔM(t) = λ[M * (t) - M(t -1)].  This specification has the disadvantage that 
spending adjusts at the same rate to changes in all determining variables, but the 
advantage of parsimony is a powerful one. One issue that arises, however is bias due to 
autocorrelated errors. We take steps to correct for this below. 
 
 Putting all the influences on national military expenditures together, we get the 









fatalp (t), ln[real GDP (t)] , fatal - rate (t), fatalities (t), milex (t) = f + u (t) 




It is important to acknowledge that our measures of the external security environment 
are based primarily on interstate relations. Consequently, threats from non-state actors 
(e.g., terrorists) unallied with national governments will have little impact. This is less 
problematic for the period 1950-2000 than subsequently. 
 
Empirical Estimates of the Determinants of Military Expenditures:  Results 
 
To gauge the importance of the security environment, we start with a visual 
examination of Figure 3. The bivariate scatter plot shows the mean probability of 
conflict as assessed by the LRM and the mean ratio of military spending to GDP for 
each country, 1950-2000. Both of the economic variables are measured in constant 2000 
dollars calculated with purchasing power parities.12 We show three groups of countries: 
                                                 
12 Cross-national estimates of military expenditure are subject to error (Lebovic 1998, 
Smith 1995, Dunn and Smith 2007). Comparability is greatest for democracies and 
developed economies. Some estimates may exhibit inertia due to analysts’ simply 
extrapolating from initial estimates. After close study of many sources we settled on 
the military expenditure component of the Correlates of War dataset on national 
material capabilities (http://www.correlatesofwar.org/) for 1950-1987, but found the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute data (available only for subsequent 
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the largest 20 by GDP as filled circles, the second 20 by GDP as large open squares, and 
the balance of smaller countries as small triangles. There is a positive relationship 
between the two variables, with a correlation of 0.37. The character of the security 
environment does influence national military expenditures, but clearly other forces are 
at work. Our online appendix will give the average ratio of military spending to GDP 
for our state-year sample as well as the mean probability of a fatal dispute.  
 
Table 4 begins with the simplest specification of equation (2) using the means of 
the variables for each country. We estimate the effect of the security environment (p-hat) 
on the logarithm of military expenditures, controlling only for a country’s economic 
size. We calculated p-hat using the specification in column B of Table 2. The semi-
elasticity of military spending with respect to the probability of a dispute is 
3.20 (+ 0.63). This is slightly larger than the country-year results we report next, but it is 
a useful point of departure. 
 
Table 5 reports the estimated coefficients from four pooled analysis of panel data 
for 165 countries, 1950-2000, for the simple specification that includes only p-hat, our 
prospective measure of the security environment, and GDP. We use the panel 
estimators in EViews 6.0; neither time nor fixed country effects are included. The first 
row shows the analysis of pooled data with no inertial effect but with a correction for 
autocorrelated errors. The second row accounts for inertia with a lagged dependent 
variable (LDV) and also includes a correction for an AR(1) process. 
 
Use of a lagged dependent variable when there is autocorrelation in the error 
term introduces bias in the estimated coefficients. We address this problem in the third 
and fourth rows of Table 5 using an instrument for the LDV. Solving for military 
spending in the partial-adjustment model shows that it is a function of current and past 
values of GDP, the security environment, and other independent variables. We 
therefore used lags of the independent variables as instruments and exclude additional 
lagged dependent variables in all runs. We found no improvement in the fit for the IV 
after two lags, so we limit our IV to that number. We estimate the equation without and 
with an AR correction (rows 3 and 4).13 
                                                                                                                                                             
years, at http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_data_index.html) to be 
more plausible and better documented. The two series are nevertheless highly 
correlated. We extended the SIPRI data backwards by regressing on COW’s estimates. 
We then converted the data to PPP-based estimates. Data for China and USSR/Russia 
are notably controversial. COW showed a very big drop in Chinese military spending 
in 1985 continuing into 1988. As that conflicts with all other reports, we raised our 
estimate to be consistent with  SIPRI’s. A similar drop in SIPRI’s data for Russia/USSR 
from 1988 to 1991 is consistent with other estimates and with the demise of the Soviet 
Union. 
13 We reproduced the results for rows 1 and 2 of Tables 3 and 4 using STATA 10.1, but 





We prefer the specification in row 3, but both 3 and 4 have several important 
features. First, it is apparent that the estimated coefficient (0.956) of the LDV in row 2 is 
badly biased. In row 2, the lagged value of military expenditures accounts almost 
completely for current military spending. Using the instrumented variable in rows 3 
and 4 reduces its coefficient substantially. The estimated coefficient of the LDV is 
important because it is λ in the adjustment equation described above; and (1 – λ) is used 
to calculate the long-run impacts of our independent variables. Second, the coefficient 
on p-hat (and GDP) is much larger with the IV estimator than in the OLS regressions. 
The biased estimator is reducing the apparent impact of each of the theoretical variables 
on military spending. We also show in the column “Milex unit root” the difference 
between the coefficient on the LDV (λ) and unity, along with its standard error. While 
the coefficient in row 2 is significantly different from 1.0 statistically; it is uncomfortably 
close, whereas the coefficients in rows 3 and 4 are well below that value. 
 
The last two columns of Table 5 show the semi-elasticities of military spending 
with respect to the external threat for each specification, i.e., the percentage change in 
military spending of a unit change in the probability of a fatal MID. The short-run semi-
elasticity is the estimated coefficient of p-hat; in our preferred specification it is around 
1.0. The long-run semi-elasticity, calculated as the short-run semi-elasticity divided by 
(1 – λ), is about 3.0, as seen in the last column of the table. The t-statistics on the p-hats 
are high by conventional standards. For example, in equation 3 the t-statistic on the 
short-run elasticity is 6.7.14 Examination of the variance explained confirms that the 
combined influence of the security environment and GDP on military expenditures is 
substantial. The R2 for row 1 (without an AR correction or lagged dependent variable) is 
0.78. The R2 in each of the other equations is greater, but including an autoregressive 
correction and lagged dependent variables are not demanding tests. 
 
 To illustrate the economic significance of the results, consider the difference 
between the United States and New Zealand in the probability of a fatal dispute shown 
in Table 3. According to our estimates, this would lead to a difference in military 
spending as a percentage of GDP of a factor of 7.2 ( = exp [0.66 x 3] ). That is, the ratio of 
military expenditures to GDP for the U.S. should be more than seven times that of New 
Zealand. From Table 3, we see that it was actually five times as great for the period 
1950-2000. This shows the large substantive impact the threat environment can have on 
military spending.15 
                                                 
14 The t-statistics for the long-run coefficient were calculated with local, non-linear 
estimators using numerical derivatives. 
15 To assess the danger that our results might be biased by a reciprocal effect of 
military spending on conflict, we added the logarithm of the higher and lower 
military expenditures for each dyad-year to the LRM. Consistent with preponderance 
theory, peace proved most likely when there is an imbalance of military spending. 
Increased spending has, therefore, an indeterminate effect, across all cases, on the 




 To be sure that our analyses capture the experience of large, influential states as 
well as smaller countries, we estimated the specifications in Table 5 using only data for 
the 40 largest countries in terms of GDP. The same statistical issues arise for the large 
states as for the entire sample, and these were treated in the way we have just 
discussed. As seen in Table 6, the estimated semi-elasticities with respect to p-hat are 
somewhat smaller for the largest states than for all countries. The long-run semi-
elasticities are about 2.4 (versus 2.8) for our preferred equation 3. We also ran an 
analysis limited to 14 global and regional powers (USA, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Great 
Britain, France, Spain, Germany, Italy, USSR/Russia, China, Japan, India, and 
Indonesia), and again the results were very similar. 
 
 Although we do not focus primarily on the economic variables, real GDP does 
have a powerful impact on military spending, as expected. In virtually all the 
specifications, the long-run elasticity of military spending with respect to GDP is 1. For 
example, the long-run elasticity in Table 5 is estimated to be 1.0055 (+ 0.0087). The 
implication is that the ratio of military spending to GDP is essentially trendless once 
other variables are accounted for.  
 
More Complete Specifications 
 
Until now we have focused on different estimates of an equation that includes 
only our measure of the security environment, derived from the LRM, and GDP. We 
now extend the analysis in two steps to include a larger array of influences. First, we 
add measures of the military spending of friends and foes to control for the effects of 
arms races and alliance commitments. For this new specification, we again use our 
preferred estimate of the external threat (p-hat from column B, Table 2) and include all 
countries in the pooled panel analysis. The results are reported in Table 7. The 
estimated semi-elasticities of military spending with respect to the external threat are 
somewhat sensitive to the specification, the long-run coefficient being between 2.4 and 
2.7, with the lower number holding for in our preferred specification (column 3). The 
reason is that measuring the military expenditures of friends and foes also captures 
important characteristics of the threat environment. 
 
Interestingly, the expenditures of potential adversaries are more influential than 
those of friendly countries. There is evidence here of arms races with enemies and 
potential adversaries. If we look at column 3 of Table 7, the short-run elasticity of 
spending with respect to foes’ spending is 0.10, while the long-run elasticity is 0.30. This 
indicates that a country increases its military spending by 1 percent in the short run and 
3 percent in the long run if its potential adversaries increase their spending by 10 
                                                                                                                                                             
goes down; but if it moves the two states toward equality in expenditures, the risk 
goes up. This suggests that conflict is not endogenous to military spending in a way 
that biases the results we report below. 
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percent. Even in the long run, this reaction coefficient does not suggest unstable arms 
races. Assuming that the coefficient is 0.3 for all countries, and that the probability of 
conflict is 50 percent per year, this implies that military spending approximately 
doubles because of the action and reaction through the foes variable. 
 
Democracies spend less on the military, other things equal, than non-democratic 
states. We consider further the effects of national polities below. The results of analyses 
limited to the largest 40 countries, which are not shown, were very similar. 
 
 Next, we add two additional variables that reflect the presence of actual conflicts: 
an annual measure of a state’s involvement in fatal disputes and the number of fatalities 
a country experienced in all conflicts in a year, normalized by its population. The results 
are shown in Table 8. The estimated semi-elasticities of military spending decline 
further, with the estimate for our preferred equation in the third column being about 
1.7. The coefficient is again lower because the actual conflict variables are picking up 
more of the explanatory power of p-hat. 
 
 Tables 7 and 8 show that our prospective measure of the security environment is 
correlated with the retrospective measures we have added to the model of military 
expenditures. Nevertheless, the long-run effect attributable solely to the general 
external threat is substantial. It is remarkable that the predictions of the LRM are so 
influential with controls for arms races, the spending of allies, on-going disputes, and 
their intensity. Indeed, a comparison of the coefficients of p-hat and the actual rate of 
fatal MIDs indicates that the former exerts a greater influence on military spending. 
Clearly, states anticipate that they may become involved in militarized disputes and 
allocate resources to their armed forces accordingly. Those that exist in hostile security 
environments must arm, whether or not they actually end up fighting. Military 
spending is similar in this regard to insurance.  
 
 In sum, the long-run semi-elasticities of military spending with respect to the 
probability of being involved in a fatal dispute are in the range of 2.0 to 3.0. The precise 
value varies with the sample, the estimator used, and the other explanatory variables 
included in the specification. 
 
Democracy and military spending 
 
Next we assess the effect of democracy on military expenditures, holding other 
influences constant, including the threat environment. A simple regression of cross-
national means, as in Table 4, provides a semi-elasticity of military spending with 
respect to our measure of democracy of -0.044 ( + 0.011). Polity scores range from -10 for 
complete autocracy to 10 for a thoroughly democratic country. This suggests that 
autocracies will spend about 140 percent more than democracies on the military (= 100 x 
[exp(.88)-1]). The estimates of the impact of democracy on spending vary in different 
specifications reported in Tables 7 and 8, primarily because democracy is correlated 
with the other independent variables. A semi-elasticity of -0.03 is a reasonable mid-
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range estimate for the long-run effect, indicating that polar autocracies spend 80 percent 
more on the military than polar democracies. But military dictatorships (Gandhi and 
Przeworski 2006) spend no more than other dictatorships.  
 
This estimated partial effect is in addition to the effect of democracy on the threat 
environment, which is also substantial. Using a simple regression of the means like that 
in Table 4, we estimate that the semi-elasticity of military spending with respect to the 
polity variable, with p-hat excluded, is -0.59. This suggests that the total impact of 
complete autocracy relative to complete democracy is to increase military spending by 
220 percent. These results are less robust than our estimates of the impact of the threat 
environment, but they suggest nonetheless that democracy is an important determinant 
of military spending. 
 
Civil war and military spending 
 
How do civil wars affect military spending? Civil wars typically last much 
longer than international conflicts and are more likely to re-ignite after short periods 
of peace (Collier and Heffler 2007). Using data from Sambanis (2004), we estimated 
the impact of adding a variable that represents the probability of a civil war, similar in 
spirit to our p-hat variable. We examined the preferred equation (the third row in 
Table 5) with the variables shown in Tables 5, 7, and 8. The impact of civil wars on 
military spending is lower by a factor of around 10. For example, using the 
parsimonious specification in Table 5 and adding the probability of civil war, the 
short-run coefficient on p-hat is 0.805 ( + 0.119) while the coefficient of civil war 
probability is 0.0799 ( + 0.0285). In most specifications, if we account for 
autocorrelation (as in the fourth equation in Table 5), the estimated coefficients of the 
civil war variable are not significantly different from zero and are sometimes negative. 
 
 Inclusion of Fixed Effects 
 
 Analyses of panel data sometimes include country-fixed effects. We have treated 
our state-year observations as panel data without either country- or year-fixed effects 
for several reasons. First, there are strong theoretical grounds for believing that 
differences in the liberal and realist variables across countries significantly affect the 
probability of interstate conflict and, hence, national military expenditures. Looking at 
the average probabilities of conflict in Figure 2 and Table 3, or examining the scatter 
plot in Figure 3, suggests that cross-national influences vary substantially and are 
highly stable for individual countries.  
 
 A second important reason is evident if we consider the economic context of 
military spending. If we include country-fixed effects, a substantial part of the 
difference from trend within countries is likely to be determined by the business cycle 
and other short-term economic factors. To some extent, then, fixed effects may simply 
isolate Keynesian business-cycle correlations. This is a form of simultaneous equation 
bias that would be difficult to correct. In any event, we are not attempting to capture the 
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influence of business cycles on military expenditures, or the reciprocal influence. The 
omission of country-fixed effects helps exclude such confounding influences. 
 
 Despite our reservations, we show estimates of our simplest model with fixed 
effects in Table 9. The coefficients for p-hat are smaller than before; but the estimates are 
quite significant statistically. The long-run semi-elasticities are about 1.0 for equations 3 
and 4. We also estimated the basic equation, with just p-hat and GDP, for several 
individual countries, such as the United States, Canada, and New Zealand, but the 
standard errors of the coefficients of p-hat are too large for the results to be meaningful. 
 
 Comparing our pooled analyses with those that incorporate fixed effects leads to 
the following conclusion: The probability of becoming involved in a fatal dispute varies 
substantially across countries, and those differences have large effects on military 
spending across countries. However, if we examine changes in the threat environment 
for countries over time, the effect is much smaller, approximately one-third the size of 
the cross-sectional result reported in Table 4. This is undoubtedly due in part to 
temporal imprecision in the liberal-realist model itself, which we noted earlier; and in 
part to variability from country to country, or even over time for the same country, in 
the lag with which military spending adjusts to changes in the external environment. 
Thus, the substantial influence of the security environment on military expenditures, 
reported in Tables 3 – 8, is primarily the result of cross-national differences rather than 




 As we explained, our preferred approach is to use pooled data to estimate 
general relationships. Yet, in future research it could be useful to ask whether particular 
countries, the United States for example, spend more or less than theoretically expected. 
This can be determined either by using dummy variables just for the countries of 
interest or by estimating fixed effects, which are in effect a set of dummy variables for 
each country. For this purpose, it seems best to use the full specification without the 
actual conflict variables. If we add only a dummy variable for the United States, the 
estimated coefficient is small and statistically insignificant.  Relative to all other 
countries on average, the U.S. is not exceptional. However, with fixed effects for all 
countries, the U.S. effect is relatively large, indicating military spending around 80 
percent above the theoretically derived predictions; and there are high peaks just before 
and after the end of the Cold War. This suggests that U.S. military spending is larger 




We have used a widely accepted model of dyadic conflict, derived from liberal and 
realist theories of international relations, to investigate the relationship between a 
country’s security environment and its military spending.  No previous empirical study 
of national military expenditures has incorporated such a comprehensive, prospectively 
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generated measure of the external threat. We focused on a nearly exhaustive sample of 
165 countries for the post-World War II period, 1950-2000, but confirmed our findings 
with analyses of the 40 largest countries and 14 major and regional powers to ensure 
that our findings applied to these important nations.  
Our research provides important external evidence for the validity of the liberal-
realist model (LRM) and sheds new light on the determinants of military expenditures. 
Consistent with economists’ normative approach, the degree of threat in a country’s 
security environment is an important influence on its military expenditures. Indeed, the 
probability that a state will become involved in a fatal militarized interstate dispute, 
assessed ex ante by the LRM, is more influential than are any of several variables 
known only ex post: the actual incidence of states’ involvement in serious interstate 
conflict, the intensity of these conflicts as measured by the number of combatants’ 
fatalities, or the military expenditures of friends or potential foes. The chance of 
involvement in a fatal dispute varies greatly across countries, and those differences 
have large substantive effects on nations’ allocations of resources to their armed forces.  
 
The major result of this study is that the ex ante threat environment has an 
important effect on military spending. Our best estimate is that a one percentage point 
increase in the probability of a fatal dispute leads to an increase in military spending of 
between two and three percent of GDP, ceteris paribus. Several other findings are worth 
noting. Highly autocratic regimes spend much more on the military than do 
democracies or governments with mixed political characteristics. An increase in 
military spending by potential adversaries has only a small short-term effect but 
produces a long-term “arms race” effect of about 30 percent. The level of national 
output (measured by real GDP) has a powerful effect, as earlier studies have indicated. 
There appears to be an important inertial effect in military spending as well. Only 35 
percent of the response in military spending to a shock in the security environment, to 
output, or to other variables takes place in the first year. We cannot determine whether 
the slow response occurs because of uncertainty regarding the permanence of change, 
mere bureaucratic inertia, or the economic consequences of the large sunk costs 
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Table 1. Standard LRM equation for onset of militarized interstate conflict 
Each coefficient is shown with the standard error of the coefficient below in italics. The 
dependent variable (fatinv_nc) is a binary variable reflecting whether there is an onset of 
a fatal militarized interstate dispute (MID) in a year. The sample excludes 
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Small democracy ‐0.0860 ‐0.0938 ‐0.1170 ‐0.1030 ‐0.0889
0.0264 0.0210 0.0338 0.0285 0.0193
Large democracy 0.0430 0.0419 0.0308 0.0401 0.0532
0.0163 0.0134 0.0150 0.0154 0.0127
Trade/GDP ‐249.5000 ‐192.9000 ‐230.1000 ‐185.2000 ‐99.9900
77.4900 63.3400 71.4900 65.0500 35.1200
Contiguity 1.6990 1.1980 1.4000 1.6950 0.9460
0.4500 0.3030 0.4240 0.4170 0.3120
Distance ‐0.7850 ‐0.6650 ‐0.7660 ‐0.7410 ‐0.6200
0.1780 0.1490 0.1660 0.1670 0.1320
Ratio of GDPs ‐0.5870 ‐0.5030 ‐0.4880 ‐0.7250 ‐0.3440
0.5690 0.4830 0.5140 0.5490 0.4580
Allies ‐1.0060 ‐0.9850 ‐1.3630 ‐0.8300 ‐0.4030
0.3780 0.2100 0.3370 0.2160 0.1950
GDP relative to 11.7400 11.4200 9.9500 11.9100 11.7200
   world GDP 2.7370 1.9840 2.5250 2.0570 1.7130
System size ‐0.9690 ‐1.3870 ‐1.3140 ‐0.9290 ‐1.3850
0.3790 0.2450 0.3460 0.3090 0.2460
Constant 0.1370 ‐0.1050 ‐0.3540 ‐0.1960 0.3420
1.3440 1.0510 1.2970 1.2260 0.9670
Sample period 1950‐2000 1950‐2000 1950‐2000 1950‐2000 1950‐2000
Observations 371,080 406,067 371,062 405,923 406,067
Pseudo R‐sq 0.267 0.252 0.259 0.255 0.297




includes  "continuations," that is, second and further years of a continuing dispute.  
 
Table 2. Alternative specifications of LRM with continuation sample 
Each coefficient is shown with its standard error below in italics. 
Dependent variable (fatinv_cont) is a binary variable reflecting whether a dyad is 
involved in a fatal militarized interstate dispute (MID) in a year. The sample includes 



































Figure 1. Stability of coefficients in Table 2: Ratio of coefficient in specification A, C, 
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Figure 2. Calculated probability of conflict for eight representative countries, 1950 – 
2000 
These graphs show the estimated probability of conflict (fatal MID) for eight countries 
through time. Note the differences in the left-hand scale. Three estimates are shown for 
each country. The preferred estimate excludes peace years and uses the actual 
independent variables. The variant with actual peace years has excessive volatility (see 
Israel); the series generated using the non-continuation sample with actual peace years 


















Democratic Republic Congo 63.9 0.4
Israel 64.2 6.4
United States 71.7 6.0  
 
 
Table 3. Estimated Probability of Conflict and Military Spending Ratio, 1950-2000, 
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Figure 3. Scatter plot of mean probability of conflict and military spending fraction 






Independent variables Coefficient Std. Error t‐Statistic
Mean [probability of MID] 3.20 0.63 5.10






Observations 165  
 
 
Table 4. Estimate of effect of probability of conflict on military spending, country 
means 
 
This regression is the simplest specification for estimating the relationships among the 
three variables, 1950-2000. The dependent variable is the logarithm of real military 
spending. The independent variables are the probability of a fatal militarized interstate 








phat_b ln(rgdp) AR Milexp(‐1) Unit root Short run Long run
Pooled, No LDV 0.622           0.655           0.958         0.622           0.622             
0.202            0.040            0.003          0.202           0.202               
Pooled, LDV 0.159           0.040           ‐0.092 0.956         0.044         0.159           3.629             
0.028            0.004            0.013          0.004          0.004          0.028           0.596               
IV on LDV, no AR 0.979           0.352           0.650         0.350         0.979           2.789             
0.145            0.053            0.052          0.052          0.145           0.118               
IV on LDV with AR 0.739           0.099           0.989         0.796         0.204         0.739           2.782             
0.278            0.086            0.030          0.170          0.170          0.278           0.107                 
 
Table 5. Analyses of military expenditures, 1950-2000, all countries 
These show the results of equation (2) in the text using only p-hat, real GDP, and (in 
three cases) lagged military spending as independent variables. The different tests are 
described in the text. Row 3 is the preferred specification.  
The dependent variable is the logarithm of real military spending (Milexp). The 
independent variables are the probability of a fatal militarized interstate conflict 
(phat_b), and the logarithm of real GDP ln(rgdp). The column AR indicates that we have 
estimated a first-order autoregressive process. Milexp(-1) is a lagged dependent 
variable. “Milex unit root” tests for the difference of the military spending coefficient 
from 1. The last columns show the semi-elasticities, which are defined as the percent 







phat_b ln(rgdp) AR Milexp(‐1) Unit root Short run Long run
Pooled, No LDV 0.502           0.727           0.962         0.502           0.502             
0.262            0.074            0.006          0.262           0.262               
Pooled, LDV 0.202           0.040           0.027         0.942         0.058         0.202           3.477             
0.036            0.007            0.024          0.007          0.007          0.036           0.590               
IV on LDV, no AR 0.680           0.242           0.716         0.716         0.680           2.362             
0.126            0.044            0.045          0.045          0.126           0.148               
IV on LDV with AR 0.965           0.234           (0.256)       0.707         0.293         0.965           2.355             
0.039            0.039            0.528          0.046          0.046          0.039           0.141                 
 
Table 6. Analyses of military expenditures, 1950-2000, largest 40 countries 
These show the results of equation (2) in the text using only p-hat, real GDP, and (in 
three cases) lagged military spending as independent variables. For these estimates, the 
sample is limited to the largest 40 countries ranked by GDP. The different tests are 
described in the text. Row 3 is the preferred specification. 













phat_b 0.6134 0.1205 0.6519 0.7120
0.2002 0.0289 0.0913 0.2714
ln(rgdp) 0.7091 0.0519 0.3338 0.1378
0.0372 0.0044 0.0435 0.0820
Milexp(‐1) 0.9489 0.6842 0.7399
0.0037 0.0407 0.1613
ln(Foes) 0.1174 0.0150 0.0952 0.0263
0.0373 0.0103 0.0194 0.0500
ln(Friends) 0.0095 ‐0.0035 ‐0.0007 ‐0.0001
0.0083 0.0032 0.0047 0.0106
Democ ‐0.0056 ‐0.0025 ‐0.0108 ‐0.0015
0.0022 0.0005 0.0015 0.0029
Long‐run semi‐elasticity milex 
w.r.t. phat 0.613              2.36                2.36                2.74               
Standard error of long run 0.303 0.55 0.55              0.57
R2 0.980              0.983              0.969              0.968             
Observations 5,917              5,707              5,707              5,707               
 
Table 7. Analyses of the logarithm of military expenditures, 1950-2000, all countries, 
with additional control variables 
For a definition of key variables, see Table 5. Additional variables are: Friends is the 
logarithm of the weighted military spending of those who are allied with the country; 
Foes is the logarithm of the weighted military spending of those who are not allied with 













phat_b 0.6236 0.1001 0.418 0.725
0.2000 0.0297 0.064 0.272
ln(rgdp) 0.7134 0.0544 0.251 0.141
0.0370 0.0045 0.032 0.081
Milexp(‐1) 0.9461 0.761 0.742
0.0037 0.030 0.159
ln(Foes) 0.1166 0.0142 0.066 0.023
0.0373 0.0103 0.016 0.050
ln(Friends) 0.0094 ‐0.0030 0.0000 ‐0.0004
0.0083 0.0032 0.0041 0.0106
democ ‐0.0057 ‐0.0026 ‐0.0085 ‐0.0015
0.0022 0.0005 0.0011 0.0029
p‐actual 0.0169 0.0397 0.013 0.027
0.0173 0.0148 0.122 0.022
Number fatalities 31.03 28.7 93.0 51.0
15.14 10.8 17.2 21.7
Long‐run semi‐elasticity 
milex w.r.t. phat 0.624              1.857              1.749              3.562             
Standard error of long run 0.200                0.539                0.171            1.578               
R2 0.980              0.983              0.976              0.968             
Observations 5,917             5,707            5,770            5,707               
 
Table 8. Analyses of military expenditures, 1950-2000, all countries, with full 
specification  
For a definition of key variables, see Tables 5 and 7. p-actual is the ex post frequency of 
fatal MIDs aggregated as explained in the text; Number fatalities is the number of 






phat_b ln(rgdp) AR Milexp(‐1) Unit root Short run Long run
No LDV 0.238           0.565           0.831         0.238           0.238             
0.198          0.036          0.006        0.565          0.565            
LDV 0.245           0.106           ‐0.086 0.865         0.135         0.245           1.820             
0.071          0.009          0.014        0.007        0.007        0.106          0.532            
IV on LDV, no AR 0.326           0.259           0.696         0.304         0.326           1.058             
0.083          0.032          0.035        0.035        0.259          0.275            
IV on LDV with AR 0.319           0.259           0.010         0.695         0.305         0.319           0.910             
0.083          0.037          0.464        0.039        0.039        0.259          0.211              
 
Table 9. Analyses of military expenditures, 1950-2000, all countries, with country-
fixed effects 
For a definition of the variables, see Table 5. 
 
 
 
